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Faith Versus Reason: A Discourse Analysis
Below is an analysis of the text “God Is Not a Moderate,” a debate
between Sam Harris and Andrew Sullivan. My method for analyzing this text
involves the perspectives of narrative theory and framing, as found in Walter
Fisher’s “Narration as a Paradigm of Human Communication” and Robert
Entman’s “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” respectively.
By viewing the debate through these two perspectives, we can see the way Harris
builds his moral frame on the foundation of epistemological assumptions, and that
Sullivan does not effectively challenge those assumptions. Consequently, Sullivan
cannot offer a coherent alternative moral frame.
After analyzing their debate, I will consider the benefits of adopting
narrative rationality for continuing the conversation on more reasonable grounds.
This move, I want to show, forces Harris’ argument to fall back on its moral
frame, where it is open to the realm of public moral argument. Thus, in the debate
between New Atheism and religious pluralism, Fisher’s narrative rationality and
Entman’s framing make it possible to articulate alternative and coherent ways of
situating reason and the good. What follows is a brief introduction to the two
theories that inform the analysis.
Narrative Theory
In his model of the narrative paradigm, Fisher extends what he calls
narrative rationality to “all persons not mentally disabled” (1989, p. 67), who are
capable of assessing good reasons, “those elements that provide warrants for
accepting or adhering to advice fostered by any form of communication that can
be considered rhetorical” (1989, p. 75). Fisher calls the criteria by which all
narrative beings are capable of judging good reasons, offered as warrants for
stories told for and about them, narrative probability and narrative fidelity (these
are similar to dramatic probability and verisimilitude) (1989, p. 64-65). By
introducing narrative rationality, Fisher explicates a form of rationality with a
necessary egalitarian bias, for the purpose of rescuing public moral argument
from expert domination.
For the purpose of this analysis, it is important to understand the way
narrative rationality rejects the primacy of what Fisher calls the rational-world
paradigm. Fisher associates the rational-world paradigm with an epistemological
understanding of rationality, which holds that being rational must be learned and
is predicated on “self-evident propositions, demonstrations, and proofs” (1989, p.
60) that support arguments with “clear-cut inferential or implicative structures”
(1989, p. 59). In the debate between Harris and Sullivan, I will rely on Fisher’s
descriptions of the these two paradigms to examine the way their debate is framed
in terms of epistemological concepts of rationality.
Framing
According to Entman,
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Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to
select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item
described (1993, p. 52).
Selection refers to the fact that any form of coherent human communication
highlights certain aspects of the situation communicated about and not others
(1993, p. 53). Salience refers to the way highlighted aspects of situations are used
in communication, such as their placement or frequency, and situated with
reference to culturally significant symbols (1993, p. 53). The frame of a text or
argument can be understood in Entman’s sense by asking how the selection of
certain aspects of a situation to communicate about and give salience to involves
defining a problem as a problem, explaining the cause of the problem, judging
causal agents of the problem, and recommending a solution to the problem (1993,
p. 52). Though not all forms of communication are intentionally framed, every
form of communication at least implicitly involves selection, salience, problem
definition, causal attribution, moral evaluation, and specific solutions. Using these
criteria, I will examine the dominant moral frame in the debate between Harris
and Sullivan.
Analysis
New Atheism has become a topic of media focus recently. Vocal
proponents of the movement have made headlines with polemical articles,
controversial bestselling books, and confrontational debates. The influence of
New Atheism on public consciousness was reflected by President Barack
Obama’s inauguration address. As Daniel Rourke points out, Obama explicitly
included “non-believers” as part of the “strength” of “our patchwork heritage”
(2009).
Although Obama’s inclusiveness is laudable, Madeleine Bunting points
out that there is growing concern among academics–journalists, philosophers, and
historians like A. N. Wilson, John Gray, and Karen Armstrong, respectively–over
the rapid erosion of faith in England, where the New Atheist campaign seems to
be enjoying more success than in the U.S. (2009). In Bunting’s article, Gray
argues that, in the midst of a global financial crisis and increasing social
fragmentation, New Atheist arguments can be particularly troublesome because
they sideline the fact that all human thinking and sociality relies on myth in the
form of narrative (2009). Thus, New Atheists misconstrue our epistemological
situation by suggesting narrative can be replaced by the clear light of reason and
truth. In fact in Bunting’s article Gray claims that New Atheists are only offering
a new moral myth that may be “cruder, less tested, and less instructive” (2009).
As a result, scholars who detect this epistemological blindness in New Atheist
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arguments are often “simply not interested in the debate,” according to Bunting,
and frequently decline public opportunities to speak alongside proponents of what
they see as a crude ideology (2009). Yet intellectual moderates who take up the
challenge in the name of religious pluralism often fail to successfully question the
basic epistemological and moral frame of New Atheism, offering no explicit
alternative for people who value strong arguments but find religious myths
incompatible with reason.
A clear example of this situation can be seen in a recent online debate
between Sam Harris, author of The End of Faith, and Andrew Sullivan, author of
The Conservative Soul. During the course of their debate, Sullivan attempts to
resist Harris’ moral judgments while remaining within Harris’ epistemological
world picture. Hence, Sullivan has to cede a logical victory to Harris in the end.
Harris states his epistemological assumptions and spells out his basic
moral frame in reverse order throughout the debate. Consequently, we can find a
clear indication of Harris’ epistemological commitments in this excerpt from the
middle of the text:
For those interested in the origins of the universe, there is the real
science of cosmology. For those who want to know about the
evolution of life on this planet, biology, chemistry and their
subspecialties offer real nourishment. (Knowledge in most
scientific domains is now doubling about every five years. How
fast is it growing in religion?) And if ethics and spirituality are
what concern you, there are now scientists making serious efforts
to understand these features of our experience—both by studying
the brain function of advanced contemplatives and by practicing
meditation and other (non-faith-based) spiritual disciplines
themselves. Even when it comes to compassion and selftranscendence, there is new wine (slowly) being poured. Why not
catch it with a clean glass? (2007)
Harris places the responsibility for telling the truth about who, how, and where we
are as a society squarely in the domain of expert technical knowledge, treating the
meaning of human life the same as any other entity science can study: “As I wrote
in The End of Faith, whatever is true about us, spiritually and ethically, must be
discoverable now” (2007). With Harris’ epistemological view in mind, we are
ready to go back to the beginning of the debate to see how he builds his moral
frame.
Harris clearly states his position in his opening remarks:
I think you and I agree that there is a problem with religious
fundamentalism…. We are both especially concerned about Islam
at this moment--because so many Muslims appear to be
"fundamentalists" and because some of the fundamentals of Islam
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pose special liabilities in a world overflowing with destructive
technology…. Where I think we disagree is on the nature of faith
itself. I think that faith is, in principle, in conflict with reason (and,
therefore, that religion is necessarily in conflict with science),
while you do not. Given my view of faith, I think that religious
"moderation" is basically an elaborate exercise in self-deception,
while you seem to think it is a legitimate and intellectually
defensible alternative to fundamentalism (2007).
While the blending of fundamentalism with technology led him take up the pen
for atheism, Harris regards all religion as problematic. In fact, Harris makes it
clear later in the debate that religious moderates are his primary target for moral
condemnation, the enabling agents who provide shelter for fundamentalist
discourse and prevent intelligent discussion about spirituality:
I do not consider religious moderates to be "mere enablers of
fundamentalist intolerance." They are worse. My biggest criticism
of religious moderation … is that it represents precisely the sort of
thinking that will prevent a fully reasonable and
nondenominational spirituality from ever emerging in our world
(2007).
According to Harris, moderates, who attempt to accommodate science and
religion, are logically inconsistent and, therefore, more irrational than
fundamentalists: “It is true that [moderates] have taught me to appreciate the
candor and the one-note coherence of religious fanatics” (2007). Harris
summarizes his vision of the ideal development of individual moral autonomy in
the following way:
I'm asking you to imagine a world in which children are taught to
investigate reality for themselves, not in conformity to the religious
dogmatism of their parents, but by the lights of truly honest,
fearless inquiry. Imagine a discourse about ethics and mystical
experience that is as contingency-free as the discourse of science
already is. Science really does transcend the vagaries of culture
(2007).
From these remarks, Harris’ positive value judgments take shape: moral maturity
requires stepping outside cultural contingencies to take up the unbiased view of a
disinterested, technically trained, scientific observer. Thus, Harris’ moral frame
and epistemological assumptions are intertwined.
We can show their connection by reconstructing Harris’ frame in four
steps. (1) He defines the problem: Religious moderates cloud the arena of public
debate over spirituality, shielding dangerous fundamentalists from criticism and
ridicule by protecting religion and other outdated remnants of cultural
contingency in general. (2) He explains the cause of the problem: Religion and
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other remnants of cultural contingency are in direct conflict with reason, and
otherwise intelligent moderates, whose reason has been deluded by religion, are
unwittingly hampering the advance of science. (3) He makes moral judgments:
Reason, which includes science and rationality, is good, and faith/tradition, which
includes religion and irrationality, is bad. While all religious believers are
unreasonable, moderates are the most irrational because they are logically
inconsistent and (self)deceiving. (4) He suggests remedies: The solution to all
challenges posed by the irrational remnants of culture is to step outside of cultural
biases by adopting the worldview of science, to become detached, rational
experts.
Harris’ epistemological picture can be described using Fisher’s rationalworld paradigm, which is “based,” in Fisher’s words, “on the assumption that
some people are qualified to be rational and others are not” (1989, p. 67). By
emphasizing this definition of rationality, Harris challenges Sullivan to articulate
a defense of faith and cultural contingency that steers between the Charybdis of
morally indefensible irrationality and the Scylla of morally defensible atheism.
In his response, Sullivan primarily attempts to navigate Harris’ obstacle
course by justifying the possibility of the supra-rational, or a positive sense of the
non-rational:
But just because … Truth may be beyond our human
understanding does not mean it is therefore in a cosmic sense
unreasonable. As John's Gospel proclaims, in the beginning was
the Word — logos — and it is reasonable. At some point faith has
to abandon reason for mystery — but that does not mean — and
need never mean - abandoning reason altogether (2007).
Rather than questioning Harris’ epistemological picture and presenting an
alternative moral frame, Sullivan attempts to supplement Harris’ frame with a
third category of preposterous reason that makes no sense within the rationalworld paradigm.
For me, the radical truth of my faith is therefore not that God
exists, but that God is love (a far, far less likely proposition). On its
face, this is a preposterous claim, and in my defense, I have never
really argued in this dialogue that you should not find it
preposterous. It can be reasoned about, but its truth itself is not
reasonable or reachable through reason alone. But I believe it to be
true--not as a fable or as a comfort or as a culture. As truth. And
one reason I am grateful for this discussion is that you take this
truth claim seriously on its own terms (2007).
By not questioning Harris’ presuppositions about the internal connections among
reason, epistemology, and the good, Sullivan fails to escape Harris’ definition of
faith and cultural contingency as misguided and irrational. In other words,
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accepting Harris’ epistemological world picture makes it practically impossible
for Sullivan to avoid Harris’ moral categories. Sullivan agrees with Harris that
rationality is good and irrationality is bad. However, according to Harris’
epistemological definition of rationality, Sullivan’s faith is bad. To avoid the
morally negative category of irrationality established by Harris’ frame, Sullivan
would have to first deconstruct Harris’ epistemological definition of rationality
and then offer a more inclusive understanding of rationality where his faith could
be both non-epistemologically founded and good.
In his concluding remarks, Harris is happy to point out the snare Sullivan
reluctantly stepped into:
You acknowledge the absurdity of faith, only to treat this
acknowledgment as a demonstration of faith's underlying
credibility…. You want to have things both ways: your faith is
reasonable but not in the least bound by reason; it is a matter of
utter certainty, yet leavened by humility and doubt; you are still
searching for the truth, but your belief in God is immune to any
conceivable challenge from the world of evidence. I trust you will
ascribe these antinomies to the paradox of faith; but, to my eye,
they remain mere contradictions, dressed up in velvet (2007).
By accepting the rules of the rational-world paradigm, Sullivan was unable to
resist this conclusion. Sullivan could only suggest there may be more to life than
logic, ceding a logical victory to Harris.
Conclusion
Using Fisher’s narrative paradigm to undermine Harris’ epistemological
ground, I will offer a brief sketch of how to open this debate up for public moral
argument and alternative moral frames.
To illustrate the difference between the rational-world paradigm and the
narrative paradigm, and to show why the rational-paradigm is insufficient, Fisher
quotes Alasdair MacIntyre: “To call an argument fallacious is always at once to
describe and to evaluate it” (1989, p. 66). Fisher concludes, “Traditional
rationality is, therefore, a normative construct. Narrative rationality is, on the
other hand, descriptive; it offers an account, an understanding, of any instance of
human choice and action, including science” (1989, p. 66). Thus narrative
rationality is more inclusive. In addition, epistemology loses traction at the level
of understanding, for no amount of rational discoveries can ever add up to the
meaningful context of interpretation necessary to make sense of those discoveries.
Understanding (narrative rationality) can include epistemology but not vice versa.
This insight denies science the possibility of ever proclaiming what a good life
entails for everyone. Thus, Sullivan could have responded to Harris’ by saying,
Your moral picture is upside down: epistemology does not make an understanding
of ourselves and the world possible but the reverse. And an understanding of the
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good in narrative terms is always already the condition for the possibility of an
explanation of the true and the right.
The claim that science offers the best way to think about morality is not
secured by deductive reasoning but offered as a morally appealing story. Heroism
and other positive values are associated with honestly facing the facts of life–
made all the more admirable when one is understood as staring unflinchingly into
a meaningless void, defiantly giving sense to one’s life. It is not because this story
has all the facts right that it is appealing but because it describes itself as brave
enough to admit difficult facts. Thus the New Atheist story is appealing because,
according to the criteria of narrative probability and fidelity, it fits better with a
particular, contingent human understanding of the good life. Charles Taylor
makes a similar argument in A Secular Age, where he cogently argues that
exclusive humanist stories are admirable but limited because they almost
inevitably end in triumphal individualism (2007, p. 702-703).
Thus, there is nothing epistemologically compelling about Harris’ moral
frame and, as a moral story, it is vulnerable. The idea of detached, rational control
over the contingencies of culture and a meaningless universe all too easily lend
themselves to callous, atomistic individualism and the erosion of reciprocity and
community in public life. This is at least one way to begin public moral argument,
with the help of narrative rationality, over what the relationship between religion,
reason, and the good should be.
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